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EVIDENCE OF DIFFERENCES IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET 
MANAGEMENT IN EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES 
 
  
  In individual countries, banking insolvencies trace to difficulties in constraining the 
extent and character of risk-taking and risk-shifting by banks. Risk-shifting occurs when 
particular bank stakeholders are not adequately compensated for the risks to which they are 
exposed.     
  EU directives and Basel agreements divide cross-country accountability for preventing 
and resolving bank insolvencies in an economically arbitrary way. If a multinational European 
bank were to fail, the EU’s 1994 Directive on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes makes host countries 
responsible for paying off at least the domestic depositors of any banking offices the failed 
organization might have operated in their jurisdiction
1.  
  Although the host country is charged with supervising banking entities that operate 
within its borders, Basel arrangements make home-country officials responsible for supervising 
the accounts of the consolidated multinational organization to which a host-country subsidiary 
would report. This gives regulators in both countries authority to influence loss exposures and 
insolvency resolution at host-country banks. Losses large enough to ruin a host-country 
subsidiary might be dumped on it by a wily offshore parent or a slippery host-country subsidiary 
might avoid ruin by hiding its losses in assets it manages to transfer to the home country at an 
inflated value. Unfair though it might be, cross-country differences in bankruptcy procedures and 
in the effectiveness of market and regulatory discipline exerted in different jurisdictions could 
                                                 
1 See Huzinga (2005) for an extensive revision of this Directive and the remaining differences across the EU 
countries.   3
force taxpayers of a home or host country to shoulder the bill for negligent acts of safety-net 
officials, auditors, or creditors in a partner country (Eisenbeis, 2004 and 2006; Eisenbeis and 
Kaufman, 2006).  
  This paper develops a way for EU regulators to assess their taxpayers’ exposures to loss 
from partner countries. Our method estimates how well, on average, markets and regulators in 
individual countries manage to control deposit-institution risk-shifting during a specified time 
period. Sections I and II explain that our procedure combines two steps. We first construct time 
series for leverage, return volatility, and safety-net benefits at individual EU financial 
institutions. For stockholder-owned banks, our calculations use 1993-2004 data on stock-market 
capitalization.  In generating these data for mutual institutions, we draw on less frequently 
reported accounting values to construct (albeit less precisely) these same three time series. 
  Section III takes the second step, feeding the first-step estimates as input into regression 
models of ex ante safety-net benefits and interpreting the results. We show that parameters of the 
second-step models express differences in the magnitude of safety-net subsidies and in the ability 
of financial markets and regulators in member countries to restrain the flow of safety-net 
subsidies to commercial banks and savings institutions. The final section shows that our 
estimates help to predict cross-border merger activity among banks. It argues that it is poor 
policy for the EU to allow banks to merge into and out of differently subsidized and differently 
controlled environments without explicitly considering the efficiency, stabilization, and 




I. Risk-Shifting Opportunities Provided by the Safety Nets   4
  It is instructive to conceive of a country’s financial safety net as an evolving and 
purposively incomplete contract whose counterparties are major sectors of that country’s 
economy. This contract has two dimensions. First, it allocates de facto responsibility for 
controlling bank risk-taking and recapitalizing insolvent institutions to specific regulators and 
bank stakeholders. Second, to alleviate customer losses in economically and politically arduous 
circumstances, it authorizes government officials to assign to taxpayers some of the costs of 
resolving bank insolvencies that supervisory pressure and market discipline fail to prevent.  
  Financial safety nets expand risk-shifting opportunities by reducing incentives for 
depositors and other private counterparties to monitor and police risk taking by banks. The costs 
and benefits a country receives from its safety net depend on how much market discipline the net 
displaces and how successfully safety-net managers substitute explicit and implicit insurance 
premiums and takeover threats for the credit-market discipline they displace.  
  All EU safety nets include depositor guarantees. By exerting lobby pressure, a country’s 
banking industry can and (we find) do keep these guarantees from being fully priced. The result 
is that an increase in a bank’s overall risk exposure can almost always increase the value of the 
safety-net benefits it receives. This creates an incentive to search out and to exploit weaknesses 
in risk-control arrangements. At the same time, takeover threats exerted by safety-net managers 
make it uneconomic to maximize the value of current-period benefits.  The result is that bankers 
support their risk-taking partly – but only partly – with off-balance sheet risk capital that they 
extract strategically via the safety net from taxpayers and less-adventurous banks (Kane, 1995; 
Honohan and Klingebiel, 2002).  
  Merton (1974) models the equity of a firm as a call option on the firm’s assets whose 
exercise price is the book value of creditor claims (B). When B exceeds the value of bank assets,   5
creditors absorb the difference. Safety-net support allows creditors to put some or all of their 
losses to safety-net managers. This reduces the net default risk that markets for equity and debt 
must price (Vallilou and Xing, 2004). 
  The per-period flow of safety-net benefits that bank stockholders enjoy can be defined as 
a “fair” insurance premium (IPP) expressed per euro of a bank’s deposits. Merton (1977, 1978) 
shows that the IPP increases both with a bank’s leverage and with the volatility of its returns. In 
Merton’s one-period model, leverage is measured as the ratio of the market value (D) of deposits 
and other debt to the market value of a bank’s assets (V). Volatility is defined as the standard 
deviation of the return on bank assets (σV). Our first-round estimates replace D with its book 
value (B) and our second-round models parsimoniously linearize the IPP as:  
             IPP = γ0 + γ1σV + γ2(B/V) + ε1.
2                     (1)  
This formulation implies that, other things equal, the value of safety-net benefits increases in 
both σV and B/V.  By themselves, the positive partial derivatives  V IPP ∂σ ∂ γ = 1 and 
) / ( 2 V B IPP ∂ ∂ γ =  in (1) tell us how much incremental value bank stockholders might extract 
from the safety net by increasing the associated form of risk-taking.  
  The benchmark single-equation model (1) does not explicitly recognize that debt and 
deposit-insurance contracts convey covenant-like monitoring and loss-control powers to 
creditors and safety-net managers that empower them to restrain risk-shifting directly (Kane, 
1995). To analyze the risk-shifting process at individual countries and banks, we estimate a 
version of the two-equation model pioneered by Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1992). To address 
whether and how well safety-net covenants constrain bank-risk-shifting incentives, Duan et al. 
introduce into the Merton model a structural equation for the debt-to-asset ratio, B/V:  
                                                 
2 Because the implicit Taylor-series expansion occurs around positive IPP mean values in each country, the zero 
lower bound on IPP is not a worrisome source of bias.    6
 B/V  =  α0 + α1σV + ε2. (2) 
Equation (2) is a locus of potential market-equilibrium points that expresses a tradeoff between 
the pursuit of current safety-net benefits and the bank’s exposure to takeover by creditors or 
insurers.  Substituting (2) into (1) produces the following (partially) reduced-form equation:  
 IPP  =  β0 + β1σV + ε3, (3) 
where ε3=ε1+ γ2ε2.  Even though it is convenient to estimate (2) and (3) separately, an underlying 
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  In portraying volatility as an exogenous variable, the model assumes that  V σ  represents a 
value-maximizing decision made in response to a vector of unobserved bank-specific profit 
generators. The underlying intuition is that of a dynamic rational-expectations game: each bank 
sets its leverage and asset volatility jointly, with the understanding that creditors and safety-net 
managers monitor these values and restrain leverage by raising funding costs and standing ready 
to take over the franchise in the event of insolvency. In turn, creditors and regulators expect 
banks to react ex ante and ex post to the discipline they provide. Equation (2) expresses the 
hypothesis that, in equilibrium, outside monitoring constrains banks to choose points that lie on a 
locus of mutually acceptable leverage and volatility pairs.   
Given the external discipline a bank faces, the sign of β1 in equations (3) and (5) indicates 
whether a bank’s covenanted contracting environment allows increases in asset volatility to 
increase the multiperiod value of its safety-net guarantees. In principle, the total derivative β1 
incorporates the value of the opportunity to operate the bank in future periods (Ritchken,   7
Thomson, and DeGennaro, 1993).  If β1 is nonpositive, risk-shifting incentives in a given country 
are fully neutralized.  
To constrain risk-taking at all, outside limitations on leverage must be risk-sensitive 
enough to overcome the “inside” value of leverage to bank stockholders so as to establish a 
negatively sloped locus of acceptable B/V and σV values.  However, a negative α1 only implies 
that risk-sensitive capital regulation and complementary takeover and market discipline partially 
constrain realizable safety-net benefits. As an input into β1 in equation (5), the size of α1 tells us 
whether at the margin outside discipline is potent enough to persuade the bank not to increase 
return volatility when outside capital requirements increase. To neutralize risk-shifting incentives 
at the margin, outside pressure must induce a decline in B/V large enough to offset the current-
period increase in IPP a higher σV would otherwise generate.  
  Thus, for market and regulatory pressure consistently to discipline -- and potentially to 
neutralize -- incremental risk-shifting incentives, two conditions must be met: 
Capital must increase with volatility:    α1 < 0, 
Guarantee value must not rise with volatility:  β1 ≤ 0. 
Although the values of assets, guarantees, and volatility are imbedded in a bank’s stock price, 
none of these variables is directly observable.  However, Marcus and Shaked (1984) show that 
we can use option-based numerical expressions for the value of deposit insurance to track these 
variables synthetically. Because finance theory tends to focus on unobservable values, running 
regressions on synthetic data sets is a common practice in finance. This two-step approach tests 
substantive hypotheses about asset valuation jointly with the subsidiary hypothesis that the 
synthetic observations are reliable estimates of the true variables.     8
Every model makes deliberate and hard-to-defend simplifications. In interpreting our 
parsimonious regression experiments, we cannot rule out the possibility that omitted variables, 
measurement error, and simultaneous-equation bias distort the outcomes in unknown ways. 
Murphy and Topel (1985) show that standard errors of substantive parameters are often 
underestimated in two-step tests. These considerations suggest that we should interpret t-values 
conservatively and subject our results to robustness checks. 
The first step in the Marcus-Shaked procedure is to generate tracking values for V and σV 
by numerical methods.  These values are then used to estimate IPP as the value of a put option on 
bank assets. The procedure begins by solving the call-option formula for equity, E.
3 The last step 
uses Îto’s lemma to link σV to E, V and σE (the instantaneous standard deviation of equity 
returns) by means of equation (6): 
  σV = σE(E/V)/(∂E/∂V). (6) 
The procedure follows Merton (1977) in portraying deposit insurance as a single-period 
European put option on the bank’s assets. Merton treats bank equity as the sum of a dividend-
unprotected European call option and the present value of the dividends distributed before the 
option’s expiration date. The bank’s debt is assumed to mature in one year, which is also the 
assumed exercise date for the insurer. The model expresses the value of a bank’s equity, E, and 
the value of the fair deposit insurance premium, IPP, as: 
  E = V[1-(1- δ)
T] + V(1- δ)
TN(x1) - BN(x2), (7)   
                                      IPP = N(-x2) - (1- δ)
TN(-x1)V/B. (8) 
                                                 
3 To establish whether inferences are robust to differences in how forbearance is modeled, it is useful to conduct 
regressions using proxies for V, σV, and IPP derived from different models of deposit-insurance option value. 
Hovakimian and Kane (2000) provide a detailed discussion of three such models. 
   9
In (7) and (8), δ is the fraction of bank assets distributed at each interim dividend date to 
stockholders, T is the number of interim dividend payments, N(xi) states the probability that the 
variate value x is ≤ xi, given that x is distributed with zero mean and unit variance.
4  
Ronn and Verma (1986) adapt Merton's model to account for the likelihood that safety-
net managers would forbear from exercising their right to call the put when their claim is only 
slightly in the money. When forbearance occurs, the value of the short position in the put can 
turn negative. The RV model scales down the effective exercise price of the put for all banks and 
all dates by a factor of ρ = 0.97. The data we employ to estimate equations (2) and (3) set T 
equal to one year:  
  E = V[1-(1- δ)
T] + V(1- δ)
TN(x3) - ρBN(x4), (9)   
  IPP = N(-x4) - (1- δ)
TN(-x3)V/B. (10) 
  Although we will experiment with other specifications eventually, for fixed samples, the 
policy implications of regression experiments using U.S. data have proven relatively insensitive 
to variation in ρ
5. Moreover, Pennacchi (1987a and b) shows that, by counterfactually presuming 
prompt and complete insolvency resolution, single-period models of IPP tend to understate the 
economic value that government guarantees convey to bank stockholders.  In exploring 
differences in risk-shifting opportunities and authorities’ ability to constrain them, this bias 
increases the power of regression tests based on a minimal-forbearance model. 
 
II. Input Data 
                                                                                                                                                           
  Tables 1 through 3 summarize the synthetic datasets on IPP, B/V, and σV over which we 
conduct regression experiments. Our goal is to compare the quality of safety-net management not 
                                                 
4 x1 = [ln((1-δ)
TV/B)+σV
2 T/2]/(σV√T), x2 = x1 - σV√T, x3 = [ln((1-δ)
TV/ρB)+σV
2 T/2]/(σV√T), x4 = x3 - σV√T. 
5 Of course, parameter estimates are sensitive to differences in the years and countries covered in any experiment.   10
only across countries, but also between commercial banks and savings institutions in each 
country.  
  Because commercial banks are stockholder-owned, regression inputs can be calculated 
from data on bank stock prices recorded on Bankscope. However, savings banks and credit 
cooperative banks are mutual institutions. This has three important consequences. First, values 
for E, B/V and σV must be calculated entirely from book values. Given that balance-sheet data 
are reported less frequently than stock prices, variation in returns is bound to be understated for 
mutual institutions. Second, at mutuals, risk-taking incentives are blunted because owners and 
managers cannot divide potential gains from risk-shifting by writing easily enforceable side 
contracts. Third, mutual institutions do not pay dividends. Assuming that market-determined 
interest rates are paid on loans and deposits, we treat the reported value of “distributed profits” 
(contributions to social works and social funds) as a rough counterpart. In interpreting statistical 
tests, we must recognize that the reliability of coefficient estimates in IPP equations for mutuals 
is weakened by these difficulties.  The Appendix shows the main sources of information 
employed to estimate IPP, B/V, and σV values separately for commercial banks and for savings 
and cooperative banks. To provide proxies for market-value data for mutual institutions, we 
experiment with two alternatives: the first employs book values for E, B/V, and σV; the second 
generates synthetic market-value data by using the model and parameters estimated for 
commercial banks. Our procedures are summarized in the Appendix. 
  Table 1 shows the size of sample cells for both types of institutions in each of the EU-15 
countries. For all but four countries (Austria, Sweden, Italy, and Germany) the number of 
observations for commercial banks exceeds that for mutual institutions. For several countries, 
data on mutual institutions are scant and may not be fully representative of overall industry   11
experience. Gaps in data availability persuade us to delete Greece from the study and limitations 
on sample size lower the power of statistical tests for comparisons involving a few other 
countries.   
  Table 2 presents estimates of the mean values found for our three input variables at 
commercial banks in each country. B/V ranges from a low of 83 percent in Spain to a high of 94 
percent in Luxembourg. The mean volatility of returns varies from a low of 1.30 percent in Italy 
to a high of 3.22 percent in the United Kingdom. Most importantly, the mean value of safety-net 
benefits vary from 13 basis points per Euro in Luxembourg to 28 basis points in Denmark. 
  For mutual institutions, Table 3 reports safety-net premiums and return volatility in two 
ways. Model I applies the RV procedure directly to the accounting values these firms report. 
Model II instead runs the accounting data for mutuals through the equations used to generate IPP 
and σV for each country’s commercial banks. In most cases, the second procedure greatly lowers 
the values of safety-net benefits and volatility at mutual firms. One might interpret this as 
evidence that, on average in most EU countries, more outside discipline is exerted on 
commercial banks than on savings institutions.  
    
III. Regression Results 
  However high or low the mean value of safety-net benefits might be in a given country, 
the policy problem is to control risk-shifting at the margin. In effect, managers of risky banks 
engage regulators and creditors in an endless dynamic game. As creditors and regulators develop 
ways to counter a bank’s ability to burden them, bankers devise new strategies for concealing or 
understating their exposure to loss. The dialectical nature of this game makes it advisable to 
estimate equation (2) and (3) in first-difference form.    12
Individual-Country Estimates. Using a fixed-effects specification for individual institutions 
chartered in each country, Tables 4 and 5 estimate leverage and fair-premium equations for 
commercial banks and savings institutions separately.  
  For commercial banks, α1 is significantly negative at better than one percent, except in 
Austria, Netherlands, Sweden, and Italy. In the ten other countries, capital discipline 
significantly restrains risk. However, β1 still proves positive for all countries, ranging from 0.001 
in Austria and in France to 0.045 in Sweden. At one-percent significance, only for Austria, 
Finland and France can we reject the hypothesis that safety-net subsidies exist.  Incremental 
safety-net control is weakest in Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands, and Denmark.  
  With the exception of Sweden, the values of α1 and β1 found for mutual institutions in 
Table 5 using Model I do not differ much from those reported for banks in Table 4. When Model 
II is used to adjust accounting data, α1 typically becomes more negative, but β1 usually becomes 
more positive. However, when we use accounting data to fit the model to commercial banks, 
results do not differ significantly from those reported in Table 4. This suggests that, by itself, 
disciplining accounting capital might prove a more reliable way to control risk-shifting at 
commercial banks than at savings institutions.  
  Still, judging by our baseline Model I estimates, it appears that capital discipline 
importantly influences risk-taking at savings institutions. Except in Netherlands and Italy, α1 
proves significantly negative at one percent, but at that level of significance, the hypothesis of 
incremental safety-net subsidies (i.e., positive β1) is rejected only for Finland and France. The 
good news is that the magnitude of estimated safety-net benefits at savings institutions is 
relatively small, exceeding 7 basis points only for Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, 
and Italy.    13
Partitioning Countries by IPP and β1 Values.  Our policy focus is how the costs of resolving 
financial-institution distress might seep unrecognized across borders. Figure 1 divides the 14 
counties into three classes based on observable clusters in the mean value of their IPP for banks. 
Countries whose IPP is 15 basis points or less are coded as “low.” Countries whose IPP are 20 
basis points or higher are coded as “high” IPP.  The other five countries (Austria, Finland, 
Ireland, Netherlands, and Sweden) are coded as “medium.”   
  The policy issue is whether adverse economic shocks could force taxpayers and 
regulators in low-β1 countries to pay for weaknesses in market and regulatory oversight exerted 
on institutions by high-β1 countries. To explore this issue, in Figure 2 we use the β1 estimates 
reported in Tables 4 and 5 to partition the commercial-bank and savings-bank samples into three 
clusters: β1 ≤ .05; .05 < β1 < .012; β1 ≥ .012.  
  Both for banks and for supervisory officials, incentives for risk-shifting intensify as an 
institution slides into financial distress (Marcus, 1984; Kane, 1989). To protect taxpayers in 
home and host countries, markets and officials in high-β1 countries must have the authority to 
subject troubled banks to significantly stronger disciplines. To investigate this question, we 
experiment with two dummy variables. What we call the “low-capital dummy” equals 1 for 
institutions that fall in the less capitalized (i.e., more levered) half of the aggregate sample in the 
preceding period and equals zero otherwise. As a robustness check, we employ an alternative 
“high-premium dummy” that equals one for institutions whose fair premium exceeded the 
median value recorded in the previous period.  
  In Tables 6 and 7, each dummy is interacted with ΔσV. In the columns reporting on these 
experiments, the total effect of ΔσV  on the leverage ratio and fair premium is the sum of the two 
coefficients shown.    14
  Very different pictures emerge for banks and for savings institutions. In the IPP equations 
for banks in the higher-β1 subsamples, the value of access to safety-net subsidies falls for 
distressed banks and the decline is significant in three of the four cells. On the other hand, in the 
IPP equations for savings institutions, discipline strengthens for troubled institutions (though 
only at 5 percent significance) in low-β1 countries, but falls sharply in high-β1 jurisdictions. This 
is true even though leverage restrictions tighten significantly when distress emerges.  
  These results support the hypothesis that, in EU countries, it has been difficult for 
commercial banks and easy for savings institutions to expand their access to safety-net subsidies 
when they fall into distress. Still, because few savings institutions are large enough to command 
too-big-to-fail benefits or to engage in substantial cross-border activity, their risk-shifting 
capacity seems unlikely to create important loss exposures for regulators and taxpayers in partner 
countries. The greater concern should attach to large commercial banks operating in home or 
host countries whose safety-net management is not yet up to speed. 
Evidence of Learning by Doing.  Table 8 reports on the age of individual-country deposit-
insurance schemes. Hovakimian, Kane, and Laeven (2003) find that in the early years of 
operating a deposit-insurance system, officials are apt to do a poor job of replacing the depositor 
discipline they displace. Tables 9 and 10 investigate this issue for our EU-14, partitioned by the 
effectiveness of safety-net management.  
  Both for commercial banks and for savings institutions, the tables indicate that countries 
whose safety-net management is highly effective established tight control from the outset. The 
statistical significance of the system’s age in the other two subsamples indicates that safety-net 
managers in other countries did tend to improve their control as their systems aged. 
   15
IV. Robustness Issues 
Potentially observable sources of variation might explain at least some cross-country 
differences. This section investigates four possibilities. 
1. Effects from Differences in Character of Deposit-Insurance Coverage and Management. 
Tables 11 and 12 depict several ways that deposit-insurance schemes in the EU-15 differ in 
structure. Although one might suppose that differences in the design features imbedded in 
different deposit-insurance schemes could explain the bulk of cross-country differences in loss 
control, the evidence suggests that differences in regulatory culture and environment are more 
important. For example, narrow coverage does not translate directly into either low β1 or low 
IPP. Denmark, Finland, and Sweden cover the fewest categories of deposit, but our regressions 
classify none of them as a low-IPP country and only one of them (Finland) as a low-β1 country.  
Also, slope coefficients differ negligibly and insignificantly between countries whose schemes 
do and do not cover deposits that are denominated in foreign currencies or held by very large 
companies.   
  Table 13 does indicate (and covariance tests confirm) that schemes that are chartered 
either as private or public organizations control risk with similar effectiveness, and better than 
schemes in which private and public officials share control. The same table finds that schemes 
that separately guarantee the deposits of commercial banks and savings institutions are negligibly 
more effective than joint-liability arrangements.  
2. Effects From Differences in Country Size. One might also expect safety-net subsidies to vary 
with the tax capacity of individual countries.  We study this issue indirectly by asking whether 
risk-shifting behavior varies with aggregate income.  Table 14 partitions sample countries into 
three classes: those with GDP below 100 million euros, those with GDP between 100 and 350   16
million euros; and those with GDP over 350 million euros. GDP data cover 2004 and come from 
Eurostat.  Covariance tests find no differences in capital discipline by country size.  The lowest 
p-value is 0.17 for differences in slopes between the medium and lowest GDP size classes.  
However, safety-net subsidies are higher in the smallest countries and the differences prove 
significant for all pairs by covariance tests. The p-values range between 0.01 and 0.03 and 
indicate that undesirable distributional effects are more intense in smaller countries. This may be 
because their governments lack the capacity either to finance or to execute preventive 
supervision as effectively. 
3. Effects from Government Ownership. The risk-shifting process passes losses directly to 
taxpayers in state-owned institutions. This leads us to investigate whether incentives at publicly-
owned banks might differ from those at private institutions. Banks are defined as publicly-owned 
if a public (national, regional or local) authority holds at least 50 percent of its capital. The 
differences are shown in Table 15. Safety-net subsidies do prove significantly lower for public 
banks, but only at the 2-percent level.  However, the data reject the hypothesis that capital 
discipline varies between privately-owned and publicly-owned banks (the p-value for the 
covariance test is 0.22). 
4. Effects from Special Governmental Support of Major Banks. Since differences across EU 
countries in risk-shifting incentives are more likely to affect multinational banks, we compare 
risk-shifting behavior at country-champion banks with that for other sample banks. Country-
champion banks are defined as those whose total assets fall in the first size decile of EU banks. 
These banks are listed in the Appendix. Table 16 shows that country-champion banks do extract 
higher incremental safety-net benefits.  The p-value of the relevant covariance test is 0.01.  At   17
the same time, α1 estimates show that country-champion banks receive stronger capital discipline 
on average and this difference proves statistically significant at 2 percent. 
 
 
V. Policy implications for EU Merger Policies 
  Contestability theories of market structure stress the importance of entry and exit costs. 
Incentives exist for national governments to protect domestic institutions from entry by foreign 
competitors and to resist the exit of important domestic enterprises by bailing them out when 
they become insolvent. The strength and predictability of these incentives let bank stakeholders 
estimate fair insurance premiums for commercial banks and savings institutions in each country. 
In countries like the Netherlands where three large institutions dominate banking markets and 
foreign competition was until recently discouraged, too-big-to-fail benefits can be substantial.  
  Although the mean value of the safety-net benefits reported in Tables 2 and 3 range only 
between 13 and 32 basis points, these estimates are biased downward by using a model that 
assumes counterfactually that safety-net enhancements expire after only one year. Although our 
findings are subject to simultaneous-equations bias from treating changes in volatility as 
exogenous, our estimates of the rate at which benefits increase with increments in volatility (β1) 
avoid early-expiration bias. The magnitude of this coefficient ranges from 10 to 450 basis points 
for commercial banks and from 40 to 760 basis points for savings institutions.  
Some high-β1 countries (e.g., Sweden) have suffered sectoral crises, but several (e.g., 
Netherlands) have not. In any case, it is particularly dangerous for the EU either to permit banks 
such as Nordea to move their headquarters from low-β1 to high-β1 locales or to allow banks from   18
high-IPP and high-β1 countries to exploit the single-license framework to expand their footings 
in low-β1 countries.  
Consistent with the hypothesis of cross-country risk-shifting, table 17 indicates that 
capital and IPP discipline is less effective at offshore subsidiary banks than at parent institutions 
and that multinational organizations experience significantly less aggregate restraint from both 
home and host regulators than purely domestic banks do. Table 18 shows that, vis-à-vis 
estimated safety-net benefits, acquisition activity appears to move both uphill and downhill. 
Banks from high-IPP and high-β1 countries have both initiated and received the lion’s share of 
cross-border merger and acquisition activity. From a global perspective, entry of banks from or 
into high-premium or low-control home countries can generate undesirable efficiency, 
distributional, and stabilization effects. Sooner or later, EU authorities will have to confront the 
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APPENDIX 
  Four focal variables appear in our analysis: 
- B, total debt: computed as the difference between the book values of total assets and common 
equity.  
- E, the market value of a bank’s equity: computed as the end-of-period stock-market 
capitalization.  
- σE, standard deviation of the return on equity: computed as the standard deviation of: (1) 
deleveraged quarterly holding-period returns on stock for commercial banks and (2) reported 
quarterly return on equity reported by mutual institutions. 
-  δ, fraction of bank assets distributed yearly as dividends to stockholders.  
  These variables are taken directly from the Bankscope database, provided by Bureau Van 
Dijk. 
  Since a market value for equity cannot be observed for (non-quoted) savings & 
cooperative banks, we experiment for these institutions with two different models of IPP, B/V 
and σV values.   
-  Model I: This is our baseline model. It employs market or market-like values wherever 
possible. Since savings and cooperative banks do not pay dividends, we represent 
“distributed profits” as a “social dividend” that is intended to capture community claims 
that are exerted on these institutions. The “social dividend” consists primarily of 
contributions to social works and social funds.    22
-  Model II: Accounting values for IPP and σV are understated because book values that are 
reported annually cannot capture intrayear variation in B/V and σV. Model II estimates 
IPP, B/V, and σV by means of equations fitted to data for commercial banks. The 
procedure has two steps. The first step estimates equations for commercial banks in each 
country. In the second step, the accounting data for a country’s savings & cooperative 
banks are fed as input data through the numerical equations that generated IPP and σV for 
that country’s commercial banks. The following example employs real data to illustrate 
how V and σV are obtained from model II using a randomly chosen savings bank i from 
Germany that we will call SBi: 
Step 1: Fitted model for the average commercial bank in Germany in 2000: 
σV = σE(E/V)/(∂E/∂V) = (0.091)(0.243)/(1,474) = 0.015 
E = V[1-(1- δ)
T] + V(1- δ)
TN(x3) - ρBN(x4) = V [1-(1- 0.23)
1] + V(1- 0.23)
1N(x3) 
- 0.97(18523)N(x4);  
E=1636; 
V = 6732 ; 
 
Step 2: Fitted model for SBi in 2000: 
The σE, (∂E/∂V), δ, Τ and ρ parameters and the probabilities for normal densities 
estimated for commercial banks are used to compute “market” values of σV and V 
for savings bank SBi:     
σV = σE(E/V)/(∂E/∂V) =  (0.091)(0.198)/(1,474) = 0.012  
E = V[1-(1- δ)
T] + V(1- δ)
TN(x3) - ρBN(x4) = V[1-(1- 0.023)
1] + V(1- 
0.023)





LIST OF COUNTRY CHAMPION BANKS: 
Abbey National Plc; Bank of Scotland; Barclays Bank Plc; British Arab Commercial Bank Limited; Co-operative 
Bank Plc; Daiwa Securities Trust and Banking; HSBC Bank plc; Merrill Lynch International Bank Limited; Royal 
Bank of Scotland plc; Singer & Friedlander Ltd; Standard Chartered Plc; ABN Amro Holding NV; Fortis Bank 
Nederland (Holding) N.V.; Friesland Bank; Baden-Wuerttembergische Bank AG; Bankhaus Reuschel; Berenberg; 
Banca Antonveneta-Banca Antoniana Popolare Veneta SpA; Banca Carige SpA; Banca delle Marche SpA; Banca di 
Credito Cooperativo di Roma; Banca Fideuram SpA;Banca Monte Parma SpA; Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA – 
BNL Banca per il Leasing– Italease; Banca Popolare dell'Adriatico S.p.A.; Banca popolare dell'Etruria e del Lazio 
Spa; Banca Popolare di Ancona SpA; Banca Popolare di Bari Scarl; Banca Popolare di Intra; Banca Popolare di 
Puglia e Basilicata; Banca Popolare di Sondrio SCarl; Banca Popolare FriulAdria SpA; Banca Toscana SpA; Banco 
Desio - Banco di Desio e della Brianza SpA; Banco di Sardegna SpA; Bank Fuer Trient und Bozen-Banca di Trento 
e Bolzano SpA; Capitalia SpA; Cassa di risparmio di Alessandria SpA; Cassa di Risparmio di Prato SpA 
(Cariprato); Cassa di risparmio di Rimini SpA (Carim); Cassa di risparmio di San Miniato SpA; Cassa di Risparmio 
di Savona SpA; Cassa di Banco Espirito Santo; Banco Internacional de Crédito; Banco Totta & Açores; Banco 
Internacional do Funcha (Banif);Caixa Economica Montepio Peral Caixa Geral de Depositos; Credito Predial 
Portugues; Bank J. Van Breda en Co NV; Banque Degroof NV-Banqu Degroof SA; Bank-Joh. Berenberg; Berliner 
Volksbank eG; Berlin-Hannoverschen; CBC Banque S.A.; ING-ING Belgium SA/NV; ACCBank Plc; Crédit 
Industriel et Commercial (CIC); Crédit Industriel de Normandie-Banque (CIN); Crédit Industriel de l'Ouest-Banque 
(CIO); Banque Hervet S.A.;Crédit Agricole Indosuez; Fortis Banque France SA; Banque Scalbert Dupont (BSD); 
Crédit Lyonnais; Société Générale; Crédit Agricole CA; Banque Populaire de la Côte d'Azur; Caisse Centrale de 
Crédit Coopératif; BRED Banque Populaire; Crédit Coopératif; Banque Populaire Provençale et Corse; Danske 
Bank A/S; Nordea Bank Danmark Group A/S; Depfa Bank Plc; Allied Irish Banks plc; Dexia Banque Internationale 
à Luxembourg SA - Dexia BIL; Deutsche Bank Luxembourg SA; Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB; Euro Invest 
Bank AG; Partner Bank AG; Wiener Privatbank Immobilieninvestment AG; Foereningssparbanken (Swedbank); 
Hypothekenbank AG; BHW-Bank AG; CommTrust Wertpapierhandelsbank AG; Deutsche Apotheker- und 
Arztebank eG; Deutsche Bausparkasse BADENIA AG; Deutsche Hypothekenbank (Actien-Gesellschaft); Deutsche 
Schiffsbank AG; Die Sparkasse Bremen; Dresdner Bank AG; DVB Bank AG; Eurohypo AG; Hypothekenbank in 
Essen; Kasseler Sparkasse; KD-Bank eG - die Bank fuer Kirche und Diakonie; Kreissparkasse Bautzen; LIGA Bank 
eG; M.M. Warburg & CO Hypothekenbank eG; Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale NORD/LB; kgaa; SEB AG; 
Südwestbank AG; Vereins-und Westbank AG; Volksbank Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien; Merck Finck & Co 
Privatbankiers; Nordea Bank Finland Plc ; Merita Bank Plc; Norisbank AG; Oldenburgische Landesbank – OLB; 
Sal oppenheim jr. & Cie; Pastor; Banco Simeón; Barclays Bank, BBK; Caja de Ahorros de la Inmaculada de 
Aragón; Caja Murcia; Caixa Sabadell; Caja Vital; Caja Navarra; Unicaja; Ibercaja; Pforzheim eG; WW Bank 
GmbH; Westdeutsche Immobilienbank; Weserbank AG; Rabobank Group-Rabobank Nederland; Cassa di risparmio 
in Bologna SpA (Carisbo); Credito Artigiano; Credito Bergamasco; Credit Valtellinese SCarl; Interbanca SpA; 
Suedtiroler Volksbank-Banca Popolare dell'Alto Adile; Veneto Banca Scparl; Santander Central Hispano Group-
Banco Santander Central Hispano; Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA; Caja de Ahorros y Pensiones de 
Barcelona; LA CAIXA; Banco Central Hispanoamericano – BCH; Caja Madrid-Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad 
de Madrid; Banco Español de Crédito SA; BANESTO; Banco Popular Espanol SA; Caja de Ahorros de Valencia 
Castellon y Alicante BANCAJA; Caixa d'Estalvis de Catalunya-Caja de Ahorros de Cataluña; Caja de Ahorros del 
Mediterraneo CAM; Banco de Sabadell SA; Banco Exterior de España SA; Bankinter SA; Caja de Ahorros de 
Galicia - Caixa Galicia; Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo CAM; Banco de Andalucía; Banco de Castilla; Banco de   24
Galicia; Banco Guipuzcoano; Banco Svenska Handelsbanken; Westfälische Hypothekenbank AG- Die WestHyp; 
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Austria  1589 555  1034 
Belgium  1848 1308  540 
Denmark  1002 669  333 
Finland  146 118  28 
Luxembourg  1058 1024  34 
Netherlands  551 517  34 
Portugal  374 317  57 
Sweden  501 160  341 
Greece  290 281  9 
Ireland  353 340  13 
United 
Kingdom  1809 1757  52 
Spain  1961 1095  866 
France  2626 2045  581 
Italy  3963 819  3144 
Germany  14068 2099  11969 
TOTAL  32139 13104  19035   27
TABLE 2 
MEAN LEVERAGE RATIOS (B/V), MEAN FAIR PREMIUM (IPP), AND STANDARD 
DEVIATION OF RETURN ON ASSETS (σV)  
FOR COMMERICAL BANKS IN EU-15 COUNTRIES 





























 Model  I 
Country  B/V (%) IPP (%)  σV (%) 
      
Austria 87.654  0.158  1.366 
Belgium 92.571  0.149  1.828 
Denmark 88.579  0.280  2.937 
Finland 92.266  0.192  2.329 
Luxembourg 93.912  0.130  1.576 
Netherlands 88.838  0.152  1.876 
Portugal 89.176  0.150  1.747 
Sweden 91.904  0.176  1.732 
Greece -  -  - 
Ireland 88.286  0.152  1.837 
United Kingdom  85.454  0.219  3.222 
Spain 83.135  0.215  1.484 
France 88.021  0.212  1.427 
Italy 88.509  0.201  1.302 
Germany 87.561  0.146  1.621 
All estimated parameters are significant at the 1% level   28
 
TABLE 3 
MEAN LEVERAGE RATIOS (B/V), MEAN FAIR PREMIUM (IPP), AND STANDARD 
DEVIATION OF RETURN ON ASSETS (σV) FOR SAVINGS BANKS AND 
COOPERATIVE BANKS IN EU-15 COUNTRIES 































  Model I  Model II 
Country  B/V (%) IPP (%)  σV (%)  IPP (%)  σV (%) 
          
Austria 92.769  0.094  1.326  0.055  0.618 
Belgium 88.161  0.184  3.561  0.096  0.982 
Denmark 83.437  0.296  2.848  0.186  2.026 
Finland 92.427  0.232  1.516  0.155  1.924 
Luxembourg 95.026  0.034  0.855  0.125  1.532 
Netherlands 93.919  0.087  1.207  0.140  1.747 
Portugal 93.893  0.190  1.612  0.127  1.514 
Sweden 86.416  0.258  2.389  0.056  0.702 
Greece -  -  -  -  - 
Ireland 92.898  0.321  2.709  0.145  1.757 
United  Kingdom 90.824 0.203  1.943 0.212 3.109 
Spain 92.803  0.244  2.197  0.118  0.924 
France 94.290  0.133  1.442  0.164  1.159 
Italy 87.339  0.241  2.087  0.041  0.442 
Germany 94.883  0.100  1.130  0.021  0.427 
All estimated parameters are significant at the 1% level   29
 
TABLE 4 
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET CONTROLS 
FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS IN FOURTEEN EU COUNTRIES 
 
Panel data fixed-effects regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, (ΔB/V), and changes in its fair 
deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ΔσV.  B is the face value of bank’s debt, 
including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The second and third columns report the value of α1 
and β1, respectively. 
 
Country  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 
Austria    
ΔσV  0.000 
(0.24) 
   0.001* 
(2.25) 
Observations  555 555 
R
2  0.030 0.046 
 
Belgium   
ΔσV    -0.004** 
(-4.33) 
    0.009** 
(7.07) 
Observations  1308 1308 
R
2  0.048 0.183 
 
Denmark   
ΔσV   -0.005** 
(-7.39) 
   0.022** 
(12.69) 
Observations  669 669 
R
2  0.791 0.588 
 
Finland   
ΔσV  -0.011** 
(-21.87) 
  0.003 
(1.79) 
Observations  118 118 
R
2  0.887 0.571 
 
Luxembourg   
ΔσV  -0.004** 
(-7.69) 
  0.012** 
(11.71) 
Observations  1058 1024 
R
2  0.308 0.188 
 
Netherlands   
ΔσV  -0.003 
(-1.67) 
  0.024** 
(11.02) 
Observations  517 517 
R
2  0.589 0.370 
 
Portugal   
ΔσV  -0.006** 
(-5.31) 
    0.007** 
(4.59) 
Observations  317 317 
R
2  0.492 0.308 
 
Sweden   
ΔσV  -0.004 
(-1.75) 
   0.045** 
(6.16) 
Observations  160 160 
R
2  0.801 0.735 
   30
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Ireland            
ΔσV  -0.025** 
(-7.00) 
  0.029** 
(10.58) 
Observations  340 340 
R
2  0.256 0.361 
 
United Kingdom   
ΔσV  -0.003** 
(-5.99) 
  0.004** 
(9.09) 
Observations  1757 1757 
R
2  0.089 0.140 
 
Spain   
ΔσV    -0.006** 
(-7.48) 
    0.002** 
(3.18) 
Observations  1095 1095 
R
2  0.061 0.024 
 
France   




Observations  2045 2045 
R
2  0.269 0.313 
 
Italy   
ΔσV   -0.002* 
(2.55) 
   0.005** 
(3.04) 
Observations  819 819 
R
2  0.911 0.596 
 
Germany   




Observations  2099 2099 
R
2  0.750 0.679 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
   31
TABLE 5 
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET CONTROLS 
AT SAVINGS AND COOPERATIVE BANKS  
Panel data fixed-effects regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, (ΔB/V), and changes in its fair 
deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the changes in the riskiness of its assets, ΔσV.  B is the face value of 
bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The second and third columns report 
the value of α1 and β1, respectively. 
 
  Model I  Model II 
Austria    
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 
ΔσV  -0.002** 
(-6.50) 
0.002** 





Observations  1034 1034 1034 1034 
R
2  0.127 0.114 0.432 0.103 
 
Belgium    






  0.006** 
(6.91) 
Observations  540 540 540  540 
R
2  0.311 0.197 0.506  0.235 
 
Denmark    
ΔσV  -0.005**  
       (-8.25) 
   0.023** 
(14.74) 
   0.008** 
(-3.85) 
   0.037** 
(8.43) 
Observations  333 333 333  333 
R
2  0.791 0.628 0.545  0.743 
 
Finland    








Observations  28 28 28  28 
R
2  0.890 0.642 0.999  0.995 
 
Luxembourg    








Observations  34 34 34  34 
R
2  0.319 0.206 0.999  0.995 
 
Netherlands    
ΔσV  -0.003 
(-1.67) 






Observations  34 34 34  34 
R
2  0.592 0.396 0.689  0.984 
 
Portugal    
ΔσV  -0.006** 
(-5.43) 
   0.007** 
(4.70) 
  -0.008 
(0.55) 
   0.056** 
(15.98) 
Observations  57 57 57  57 
R
2  0.507 0.394 0.958  0.999 
Sweden    






   0.057** 
(15.18) 
Observations  341 341 341  341 
R
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Ireland    
ΔσV  -0.025** 
(-7.00) 






Observations  13 13 13  13 
R





ΔσV  -0.003** 
(-6.00) 






Observations  52 52 52  52 
R
2  0.090 0.157 0.999  0.962 
 
Spain    






  0.027** 
(6.43) 
Observations  866 866 866  866 
R
2  0.132 0.078 0.552  0.865 
 
France    






  0.041** 
(6.94) 
Observations  581 581 581  581 
R
2  0.294 0.441 0.918  0.987 
 
Italy    






  0.035** 
(26.75) 
Observations  3144 3144 3144  3144 
R
2  0.753 0.472 0.319  0.470 
 
Germany    








Observations  11969 11699 11969  11969 
R
2  0.781 0.580 0.656  0.720 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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TABLE 6 
TESTING THE INCENTIVE-INTENSIFICATION HYPOTHESIS 
 FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS, IN COUNTRIES PARTITIONED BY EFFECTIVENESS OF 
SAFETY-NET MANAGEMENT 
Panel data fixed-effects estimations regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, Δ(B/V), and changes in 
the bank’s fair deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the changes in the riskiness of their assets, ΔσV.  B is the 
face value of bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank’s assets. 
 
  TEST USING A LOW-
CAPITAL DUMMY 
TEST USING A HIGH-
PREMIUM DUMMY 
  β1≤0.005  β1≤0.005 
High Effectiveness  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 















ΔσV X high-premium 
dummy 




Observations  4244 4244 4244 4244 
R
2  0.194 0.535 0.194 0.527 
         
  0.005<β1<0.012  0.005<β1<0.012 
Intermediate 
Effectiveness 
Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 















ΔσV X high-premium 
dummy 




Observations  812 812 812 812 
R
2  0.452 0.518 0.439 0.514 
      
  β1≥ 0.012  β1≥ 0.012 
Lesser Effectiveness  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 















ΔσV X high-premium 
dummy 




Observations  1355 1355 1355 1355 
R
2  0.380 0.397 0.368 0.409 
      
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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TABLE 7 
TESTING THE INCENTIVE-INTENSIFICATION HYPOTHESIS 
 FOR SAVINGS AND COOPERATIVE BANKS, IN COUNTRIES PARTITIONED BY 
EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET MANAGEMENT  
Panel data fixed-effects estimations regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, Δ(B/V), and changes in 
its fair deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the changes in the riskiness of their assets, ΔσV.  B is the face 
value of bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank’s assets. 
 
  TEST USING A LOW-
CAPITAL DUMMY 
TEST USING A HIGH-
PREMIUM DUMMY 
  β1≤0.005  β1≤0.005 
High Effectiveness  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 















ΔσV X high-premium 
dummy 




Observations  1280 1280 1280 1280 
R
2  0.831 0.890 0.394 0.894 
         
  0.005<β1<0.012  0.005<β1<0.012 
Intermediate 
Effectiveness 
Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 















ΔσV X high-premium 
dummy 




Observations  1280 1280 1280 1280 
R
2  0.789 0.898 0.584 0.707 
      
  β1≥ 0.012  β1≥ 0.012 
Lesser Effectiveness  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 















ΔσV X high-premium 
dummy 




Observations  1949 1949 1949 1949 
R
2  0.705 0.678 0.683 0.624 
      
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level   35
 
TABLE 8 


































Year that Legislature Enacted 
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TABLE 9 
HOW THE AGE OF A COUNTRY’S DEPOSIT-INSURANCE SYSTEM AFFECTS 
COMMERCIAL BANKS, IN COUNTRIES PARTITIONED BY EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-
NET MANAGEMENT 
 
Panel data fixed-effects estimations regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, Δ(B/V), and changes in 
its fair deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the changes in the riskiness of their assets, ΔσV.  B is the face 
value of bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank’s assets. The second and third 
columns report the value of α1 and β1, respectively. 
 




Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 










Observations  8488 8488 
R




Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 










Observations  1625 1625 
R




Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 










Observations  2710 2710 
R
2  0.379 0.456 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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TABLE 10 
HOW THE AGE OF A COUNTRY’S DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
AFFECTS RISK-SHIFTING AT SAVINGS AND COOPERATIVE BANKS, IN COUNTRIES 
PARTITIONED BY EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET MANAGEMENT 
 
Panel data fixed-effects estimations regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, Δ(B/V), and changes in 
its fair deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the changes in the riskiness of their assets, ΔσV.  B is the face 
value of bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank’s assets. 
 




Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 










Observations  2561 2561 
R




Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 










Observations  12566 12566 
R




Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 










Observations  3899 3899 
R
2  0.453 0.572 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
 
 










































1. Deposits by financial institutions as defined in Article 1 (6) of Directive 89/646/EEC. 
2. Deposits by insurance undertakings. 
3. Deposits by government and central administrative authorities. 
4. Deposits by provincial, regional, local and municipal authorities. 
5. Deposits by collective investment undertakings. 
6. Deposits by pension and retirement funds. 
7. Deposits by a credit institution's own directors, managers, members personally liable, holders of at least 5 % of the credit institution's capital, 
persons responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of the credit institution's accounting documents and depositors of similar status in other 
companies in the same group. 
8. Deposits by close relatives and third parties acting on behalf of the depositors referred to in 7. 
9. Deposits by other companies in the same group. 
10. Non-nominative deposits. 
11. Deposits for which the depositor has, on an individual basis, obtained from the same credit institution rates and financial concessions which 
have helped to aggravate its financial situation. 
12. Debt securities issued by the same institution and liabilities arising out of own acceptances and promissory notes. 
13. Deposits in currencies other than those of the Member States. 
14. Deposits by companies which are of such a size that they are not permitted to draw up abridged balance sheets pursuant to Article 11 of the 





  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14 
Austria  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Belgium  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Denmark         X    X  X    X    
Finland  X                
Luxembourg  X X X X X X X X X    X X    X 
Netherlands  X X X X X X X X X X X X    X 
Portugal  X X X X X X X X X X X X     
Sweden  X        X       X       
Greece  X X X    X    X X X      X     
Ireland  X X X X X X X X X X X X    X 
United Kingdom  X X X X X X X X X X X X    X 
Spain  X X X X X X X X X X X X     
France  X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Italy  X X X X X X X X X X X X     
Germany  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   39
TABLE 12 


































Austria  PR  JT  241,000,000 180,000,000  116,000,000 
Belgium  PU  JT  443,016,000 200,641,000  103,972,413 
Denmark  PR  JT  1,803,863,000 1,188,935,000 616,107,577 
Finland  PR  JT  75,326,000 72,273,000  35,359,000 
Luxembourg  PR  JT  516,754,552 86,013,863 13,118,600 
Netherlands  MX  JT  447,757,000 406,507,000  210,652,427 
Portugal  PU  SP  156,349,940 118,853,250  61,943,201 
Sweden  PU  JT  153,315,744 147,101,781  54,320,112 
Greece  MX  JT  154,732,608 104,124,554  53,957,472 
Ireland  PU  JT  206,434,700 128,751,429  66,719,149 
United Kingdom  PR  JT  1,555,918,020 1,061,543,833 845,598,688 
Spain  PU  SP  694,856,820 573,865,000  296,260,000 
France  PR  JT  1,015,849,000 884,809,396 704,816,553 
Italy  PR  SP  1,579,939,298 526,610,551 402,068,170 
Germany  PR  SP  1,803,863,000 1,188,935,000 616,107,577 
Source: European Commission (“Estimating the effects of changing the funding mechanisms of EU Deposit Guarantee Schemes”, 
feb. 2007) and own elaboration   40
TABLE 13 
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET CONTROLS FOR COMMERCIAL 
BANKS IN FOURTEEN EU COUNTRIES: PUBLIC, PRIVATE, MIXED, JOINT-LIABILITY AND 
SEPARATE-LIABILITY SCHEMES 
 
Panel data fixed-effects regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, (ΔB/V), and changes in its fair 
deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ΔσV.  B is the face value of bank’s debt, 
including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The second and third columns report the value of α1 
and β1, respectively. 
 
Public deposit guarantee scheme 
   Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  5037 5037 
R
2  0.382 0.326 
Private deposit guarantee scheme 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  26261 26261 
R
2  0.402 0.504 
Mixed deposit guarantee scheme 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 
ΔσV  -0.003 
(-1.67) 
  0.024** 
(11.02) 
Observations  517 517 
R
2  0.589 0.370 
Joint-liability deposit guarantee scheme 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  11483 11483 
R
2  0.393 0.447 
Separate-liability deposit guarantee scheme 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  20366 20366 
R
2  0.461 0.226 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
 
 
Definitions: Schemes are designated as public, private, or mixed according to how the controlling 
organization is chartered. 
 
Joint liability indicates that a single organization insures both banks and mutual institutions. 
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TABLE 14 
HOW THE SIZE OF THE ECONOMY 
AFFECTS RISK-SHIFTING AT EU-15 BANKS 
Panel data fixed-effects regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, Δ(B/V), and changes in its fair 
deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the changes in the riskiness of their assets, ΔσV.  B is the face value of 
bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank’s assets. 
 
GDP (millions of euro) 
GDP≤100.000 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  3474 3474 
R
2  0.234 0.579 
100.000<GDP<350.000 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  4322 4322 
R
2  0.392 0.601 
GDP≥350.000 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  11230 11230 
R
2  0.218 0.544 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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TABLE 15 
RISK-SHIFTING AT PUBLICLY-OWNED VS. PRIVATELY-OWNED BANKS 
Panel data fixed-effects regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, Δ(B/V), and changes in its fair 
deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the changes in the riskiness of their assets, ΔσV.  B is the face value of 
bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank’s assets. 
 
Publicly-owned 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  1736 1736 
R
2  0.250 0.547 
Privately-owned 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  17290 17290 
R
2  0.318 0.671 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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TABLE 16 
RISK-SHIFTING AT COUNTRY CHAMPION BANKS VS. ALL OTHER BANKS 
Panel data fixed-effects regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, Δ(B/V), and changes in its fair 
deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the changes in the riskiness of their assets, ΔσV.  B is the face value of 
bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank’s assets. 
 
Country champion banks 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  1602 1602 
R
2  0.227 0.496 
All other banks 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  17.424 17.424 
R
2  0.274 0.580 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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TABLE 17 
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET CONTROLS FOR COMMERCIAL 
BANKS IN FOURTEEN EU COUNTRIES: FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES, PARENT BANKS AND 
PURELY DOMESTIC BANKS 
 
Panel data fixed-effects regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, (ΔB/V), and changes in its fair 
deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ΔσV.  B is the face value of bank’s debt, 
including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The second and third columns report the value of α1 
and β1, respectively. 
 
Foreign subsidiaries 
   Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  1156 1156 
R
2  0.362 0.540 
Parent banks 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  3327 3327 
R
2  0.402 0.527 
Purely domestic banks 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 




Observations  27656 27656 
R
2  0.379 0.456 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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TABLE 18 
ESTIMATED TRANSITION PROBABILITIES FOR CROSS-BORDER MERGER AND 
ACQUISITION ACTIVITY WITHIN AND ACROSS FAIR INSURANCE PREMIUM AND                     
β1 CLASSES DURING 1993-2004 
 
    
 
FROM/TO  High IPP  Medium IPP  Low IPP 
High IPP  29.41 11.76  2.94 
Medium IPP  17.65 8.82  5.88 
Low IPP  14.71 5.88  2.94 
 
FROM/TO High  β1 Medium  β1 Low  β1 
High β1  20.59 2.94  2.94 
Medium β1  2.94 2.94 5.88 





Source: Thomson Financial and European Central Bank for Merger and Acquisitions data.  
 
 